Court halts discovery after taxpayer sues IRS to claim dog as a dependent

Reynolds v. United States, No. 25-cv-03447. BL 438612. Court Opinion.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York stayed all discovery in a lawsuit brought by a taxpayer seeking to force the IRS to allow pet dogs to be claimed as tax dependents.

The plaintiff argues that domestic companion animals should qualify as dependents under §152 of the Internal Revenue Code. The court halted the case while the government prepares a motion to dismiss that is likely to resolve the matter at the threshold.

Holding

The magistrate judge granted a joint motion to stay discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) because the IRS showed good cause, including a strong likelihood the complaint will be dismissed, potentially broad discovery burdens, and low risk of prejudice at this early stage.

Why It Matters

• Early discovery stays are common when a defendant shows a credible path to dismissal on jurisdiction, service, or legal sufficiency grounds.

• Challenges to tax assessment or collection often run into the Anti-Injunction Act, §7421(a), and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201(a).

• Pro se tax-related suits frequently fail on standing, procedural service rules for federal defendants, or because the Internal Revenue Code does not authorize the requested relief.

Timeline

• Plaintiff filed suit seeking to claim a golden retriever as a “dependent” under §152 and raised constitutional theories.

• The IRS submitted a pre-motion conference letter outlining planned dismissal arguments.

• The court’s initial conference was adjourned due to a lapse in appropriations.

• The parties jointly renewed a request to stay the discovery.

• On December 8, 2025, the court granted the stay pending the motion to dismiss.

Key Facts

• Plaintiff sued the United States (IRS) in the Eastern District of New York and also purported to sue on behalf of her dog and other dog-owning taxpayers.

• Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the IRS to recognize “domestic companion animals” as dependents and to create regulatory criteria for that status.

• The IRS signaled it would move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) (jurisdiction and standing), Rule 12(b)(4) (insufficient process), Rule 12(b)(5) (insufficient service), and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).

• The docket reflected service issues, including failure to comply with Rule 4(i) service requirements for suits against a federal agency.

Statutory or Regulatory Framework

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) allows a court to stay discovery for good cause.

• Courts in the Second Circuit often apply a three-factor test: (1) strength of the dismissal showing, (2) discovery breadth and burden, and (3) prejudice risk.

• Article III standing requires injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.

• The Anti-Injunction Act, §7421(a), generally bars suits seeking to restrain tax assessment or collection.

• The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201(a), generally bars declaratory relief “with respect to federal taxes.”

• §152 defines “dependent” as a “qualifying child” or “qualifying relative,” and Tax Court decisions have rejected attempts to treat pets as dependents.

Arguments

Taxpayer argued:

• A domestic companion animal can meet the concept of “support” used in §152 because the owner provides food, shelter, and care.

• Excluding dogs from dependent status violates equal protection and substantive due process and amounts to an uncompensated taking.

IRS argued:

• Plaintiff lacks Article III standing because she did not plead a concrete injury, including no allegation that she tried to claim the dog as a dependent and suffered a tax consequence.

• The requested declaratory and injunctive relief is barred by §7421(a) and 28 U.S.C. §2201(a).

• Service was improper because Rule 4(i) requires service on the U.S. Attorney and the Attorney General, as well as mailing to the agency.

• The legal theories fail on the merits: the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state actors, not federal actors, and payment of taxes is not a Fifth Amendment taking.

• The Internal Revenue Code does not permit pets to be dependents, and prior Tax Court cases have rejected similar claims.

Court’s Reasoning

• The IRS made a strong preliminary showing that the complaint is likely to be dismissed, including on standing, statutory bars to relief, improper service, and failure to state a claim.

• Discovery could become broad and burdensome if it proceeds before threshold issues are resolved, especially if the entire complaint may be dismissed.

• The case remained at an early stage with no scheduling order or discovery plan in place, which reduced prejudice concerns.

• Plaintiff consented to the stay, which further reduced any risk of unfair prejudice.

• The court emphasized it was not prejudging the motion to dismiss and evaluated the merits only to decide whether a discretionary stay was appropriate.

Result

The court granted the motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the IRS’s anticipated motion to dismiss, and it directed the parties to propose discovery deadlines within five days if any claims survive.

The Takeaway

This order does not decide whether a dog can be a dependent. It signals the court sees major jurisdictional, procedural, and legal defects that make early discovery look like wasted motion.